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Legislative Implementation of the Law of the
Sea Convention in Australia
WARWICK GULLETT *

Abstract
All States with marine and maritime interests need to ensure that their
domestic laws enable them to meet their obligations, and to take
advantage of the rights afforded to them, under the international law of
the sea. This body of international law is structured around one of the
most extensive and widely ratified international treaties: the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘LOSC’).1 This paper reviews
the general process by which obligations and rights in international
treaties become part of domestic law and then examines Australia’s
experience in incorporating into its domestic law three broad areas of
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction provided in the LOSC:
maritime zones, fisheries and navigation. It is revealed that there are a
number of areas in which Australia’s domestic law does not align exactly
with provisions in the LOSC. This is due to the nature of the process for
domestic legislative incorporation of international law and the desire by
the Australian Government to contribute to the development of the
international law of the sea in areas where LOSC provisions are open to a
range of interpretations.

I

INTRODUCTION

A consequence of the consensual nature of international law is that the
negotiation process for multilateral treaties entails identifying the
maximum standards that are acceptable to all potential State parties. This
explains why international law is typically insufficiently ambitious
because its development is limited to setting obligations which are the
maximum achievable in a politically and diplomatically complex regional
or global setting. This means that a new treaty may not be as far-reaching
as some State parties intended because compromises were needed in
order to ensure the support of more States and thereby extend the
application of the treaty to more issues or a larger geographical area. One
method of compromise is to craft treaty articles in vague language. This
enables States to reach agreement on general principles and thereby
* Professor, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security; Dean of Law,
University of Wollongong.
1
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December
1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
© Law School, University of Tasmania 2014
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proceed to the conclusion of a treaty while leaving to a later date more
difficult interpretation questions about the substance of obligations. While
this may be inelegant or indeed unhelpful as a matter of legal
development, it is a feature of international law that reveals it as much a
political and diplomatic process as it is a legal process. The multilateral
negotiation process that led to the LOSC is a classic illustration of this
phenomenon. It involved a series of negotiating conferences, which
commenced in 1930 and concluded in 1982, and produced a text that is
noteworthy for its coverage of a large array of issues but with a lack of
specificity in most areas. Nevertheless, it is a treaty that can boast 166
parties.2
All State parties to a convention have the responsibility to ensure that
their domestic laws allow them to fulfil their obligations under the
convention. Regarding the LOSC, this includes ensuring that the actions
of the executive to implement LOSC obligations are authorised within the
domestic legal framework, typically under legislation, but also potentially
under executive authority contained in constitutions.3 A complication
regarding the LOSC is that many of its provisions have the status of law
outside the convention itself. This is because much of the LOSC codifies
rules of customary international law that had emerged prior to the
conclusion of the treaty in 1982. There are differences in the way
domestic law embraces convention law and customary international law.
A further complication is that the body of customary international law of
the sea has relevance to the interpretation and development of the LOSC.
The process by which domestic law is revised to incorporate new
international laws differs among States. In some States there is automatic
incorporation of international law into domestic law. In others States,
such as Australia, there needs to be legislative action. Practical and legal
problems can arise where there are disjunctions between a State’s
domestic laws and its international obligations. Problems can arise such
as where coastal State enforcement officers undertake a boarding of a
foreign ship pursuant to authority provided in domestic law which goes
beyond what is permitted under international law. In such a case a
protracted international legal dispute could arise between the coastal State
and the flag State about the correct interpretation of the international law
2
On 7 August 2013 Niger became the 165th State party to the LOSC. Additionally, the
European Union ratified the LOSC in 1998: United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the
Convention and the related Agreements as at 29 October 2013: <www.un.org/Depts/los/
reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm>.
3
For example, the boarding by Australian Special Air Services personnel in 2001 of the
Norwegian-flagged MV Tampa to prevent its docking at an Australian port was held by the
Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia to be authorised by the executive power
conferred under article 61 of the Australian Constitution: Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110
FCR 491 at 544 (French J with Beaumont J agreeing).
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while enforcement officers remain in doubt about the parameters of their
authority.

II

APPROACHES TO THE INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW INTO DOMESTIC LAW

The general approach to the incorporation of international law into
domestic law is framed by two competing theories.4 The first is dualism.
The dualism theory holds that international law and domestic law operate
in two separate, independent spheres because of the different sources of
the two fields of law (domestic law is sourced in the will of the sovereign
State whereas international law is sourced in the collective will of
individual States). This means that developments in international law do
not automatically effect change to a State’s domestic laws. Rather,
international law needs to be ‘transformed’ or ‘incorporated’ into
domestic law by a specific action of the State, typically by the enactment
of implementing legislation. The second theory is monism. This theory
holds that domestic and international law are essentially ‘part of one and
the same universal normative order’.5 A consequence of this view for
States that adopt a strict monist legal structure is that there is no need for
any specific act to incorporate international law into domestic law.
Rather, developments in international law automatically become part of a
State’s domestic law. As a general rule, common law States reflect
dualism theory and civil law States reflect monism theory. Some States
have more intricate arrangements, including some of those based on other
legal traditions (such as Islamic law) and those States that embrace a
mixture of legal traditions.6

4
See Rosalie Balkin, ‘International law and domestic law’ in Sam Blay, Ryszard
Piotrowicz, B. Martin Tsamenyi (eds) Public International law: An Australian Perspective
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 115-116. However, as indicated in the discussion
below, the monism/dualism dichotomy does not accurately reflect the complexity of
Australia’s legal regime. For example, there are differences in the manner in which treaty
law and customary law are utilised in the development of the common law or in the
interpretation of legislation or the constitution. See, eg, Hilary Charleswort, Madelaine
Chiam, Devika Hovell and George Williams, ‘Deep anxieties: Australia and the
international legal order’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 423 and Stephen Donaghue,
‘Balancing sovereignty and international law: The domestic impact of international law in
Australia’ (1995) 17 Adelaide Law Review 213.
5
Ibid p 116. See also David Feldman, ‘Monism, dualism and constitutional legitimacy’
(1999) 20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 105.
6
For example, the origin of Pakistan’s legal system is the English common law, yet its
1973 Constitution requires that its laws are consistent with Islam.
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A

Common law States

States that have legal frameworks based on English law, namely former
or existing Commonwealth States,7 generally adopt the approach that a
specific act of the legislature is needed to incorporate international treaty
law into domestic law. The international law so incorporated becomes
part of the domestic law but it is the authority of the domestic law which
gives it force. In this situation, a State could be bound at international law
to an international obligation to which it has agreed but not have the
ability to implement the obligation until any necessary revisions to
domestic law have been made. Similarly, implementing legislation could
subsequently be repealed leaving a disjunction between domestic and
international law. Nevertheless, States that are based on the English
common law may have differences in their constitutional frameworks,
which alter the manner in which international law becomes part of
domestic law. For example, international treaty obligations automatically
become part of United States (US) domestic law by virtue of a provision
in the Constitution of the United States of America (US Constitution).
Article 6 of the US Constitution provides (in part):
[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Australia is an example of a State in which treaty law obligations are not
part of domestic law until they have been transformed by an act of the
legislature. As stated by Mason CJ and Deane J of the High Court of
Australia in 1995:
It is well established that the provisions of an international treaty to which
Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those
provisions have been validly incorporated into our municipal law by
statute. This principle has its foundation in the proposition that in our
constitutional system the making and ratification of treaties fall within the
province of the Executive in the exercise of its prerogative power,
whereas the making and alteration of the law fall within the province of
Parliament, not the Executive. So, a treaty which has not been
incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct source of
8
individual rights and obligations under that law.

7

For example, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Canada, Fiji,
Ghana, Grenada, (Hong Kong), India, Ireland, Malaysia, Nauru, Nigeria, New Zealand,
Pakistan, South Africa, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tuvalu, Uganda, and the United States.
8
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286-287
(Mason CJ and Deane J). See also Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 70-71
(Dawson J), 87 (Toohey J), 159 Gummow J).
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The two principal sources of international law – treaty law and customary
law – are not treated identically in the domestic legal sphere. There is less
need to enact implementing legislation for rules of customary
international law because by their nature they are less precise and
generally have more vague obligatory standards than treaty law.
Nevertheless, customary international law can influence the development
of domestic common law9 as well as the interpretation of legislation. In
the process of interpretation the courts will attempt to construe legislation
in a manner that is consistent with international law where it is possible to
do so. The High Court of Australia aptly stated this approach nearly one
century ago: ‘[i]t is trite law that Statutes should be construed, so far as
their language permits, so as not to clash with international comity.10
This principle of interpretation is enshrined in s 15AB(2)(d) of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which provides that extrinsic material can
be used in the interpretation of an Act, including ‘any treaty or other
international agreement that is referred to in the Act’. Indeed, there is a
presumption that legislation is not intended to be inconsistent with a
State’s international law obligations.11 Nevertheless, international law
cannot be used to override the plain intention of legislation because it is
the court’s responsibility to give effect to the will of the parliament as
expressed in the words of the legislation and in relevant extraneous
material.12 Therefore, in this context, the rules of international law merely
provide a guide to how an Act should be construed and thereby provide a
source of law that can be influential in the interpretation of legislation and
the piecemeal development of the common law. This means that
customary international law of the sea could be a source of influence for
the interpretation of domestic legislation but it cannot override
inconsistent legislation. Regarding the common law, the approach taken
in Australia is to examine each rule of international law separately in
appropriate litigation to determine whether it has been received into

9

Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (Brennan J). However, the Federal
Court of Australia has determined that customary international law should not be adopted
in domestic law in the absence of enacting legislation: Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96
FCR 153. See Burmester, H and Reye, S, ‘The place of customary international law in
Australian law: Unfinished business’ (2000) 21 Australian Yearbook of International Law
39.
10
Zachariassen v Commonwealth (1917-1918) 24 CLR 166, 181 (Barton, Isaacs and Rich
JJ). In this case the High Court held that the Customs Act 1901-1910 (Cth) should be
construed consistently with the international principle that foreign ships have a right to exit
a port.
11
Feldman, above n 5, 106.
12
See below concerning the hot pursuit of the Volga.
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domestic law. However, there is no requirement that the common law
conforms to international law.13
Implementing legislation is required where existing legislation is
insufficient to enable the taking of actions to fulfil treaty obligations.
Ideally, the required legislation is developed before the treaty enters into
force, so that there is the ability to meet treaty obligations as soon as they
exist, thereby avoiding a potential breach of international law.14 This
section now reviews the three main ways to incorporate treaty obligations
in legislation.

B

Directly incorporate a treaty, or part of a treaty, in legislation

The simplest method to give effect to a treaty in domestic law is to
include it, or selected provisions, in legislation. This method ensures
consistency between domestic and international law because the text of
the treaty is copied into legislation. However, this is not the preferred
approach for incorporating treaty law into domestic law in Australia
because it has the shortcoming of leaving to the courts the interpretation
of treaty provisions, which are well known for their ‘indeterminate
language’.15 Areas of uncertainty about treaty provisions would remain
until such time as there is domestic litigation which results in a court
declaring the meaning of an ambiguous treaty provision. This approach
runs the risk of domestic courts interpreting treaty provisions
inconsistently with the meaning ascribed to them by other State parties.
Australian example: Civil liability and the Protection of the Sea (Civil
Liability) Act 1981 (Cth)
Schedule 1 of the Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth)
provides the text of the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage. Certain provisions of the Convention are
declared in the Act to have ‘the force of law’. The amending 1992
Protocol to the Convention is included in Schedule 2.
Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) s 8
(1) The following provisions of the Convention have the force of law as
13

Balkin, above n 4, p 119. See also Brent, M, ‘International law in constitutional
interpretation: A theoretical perspective’ (2012) 23 Public Law Review 197.
14
Charlesworth et al, above n 4, 445.
15
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 392
(McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Their Honours stated: ‘[W]hile the obligations
of Australia under some international conventions and agreements are relatively clear,
many international conventions and agreements are expressed in indeterminate language as
the result of compromises made between the contracting State parties. Often their
provisions are more aptly described as goals to be achieved rather than rules to be obeyed.’
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part of the law of the Commonwealth: Articles I to VI (inclusive),
paragraphs 1, 8 and 9 of Article VII, Article VIII, paragraphs 1 and 3 of
Article IX, Article XII bis (other than paragraph (b)), paragraph 1 of
Article X.

C

Specify in legislation that it is to be implemented consistently
with a treaty

A less direct way of attempting to harmonise legislation with treaty
obligations is to link the treaty to the legislation by providing that the
implementation of the legislation is to be guided by the treaty. This can
be done by including the text of a treaty in a schedule to the legislation or
by specifying in the objectives section of the legislation that decisionmakers, when administering the legislation, should consider international
obligations. This provides a clear indication that the treaty is relevant to
the implementation of the legislation but it does not give the treaty the
force of law as part of domestic law.16 The Australian example below
includes both steps of including the text of the international agreement in
the legislation and declaring the relevance of the international obligations
to the legislation.
Australian example: Transboundary fish stocks and the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth)
Schedule 2 of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) provides the text
of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks).
Section 3(2) obliges decision-makers under the Act to ‘have regard to’ the
objective of implementing Australia’s international obligations contained
in international fish stocks agreements. This section has the effect that the
international treaty obligations are relevant to the implementation of
domestic law without actually giving them the force of law.
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 3(2)
[T]he Minister, AFMA [Australian Fisheries Management Authority] and
Joint Authorities are to have regard to the objectives of:
...
16

Balkin, above n 4, p 127.
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(c)
ensuring that conservation and management measures in
the AFZ [Australian Fishing Zone] and the high seas implement
Australia’s obligations under international agreements that deal
with fish stocks; and
(d)

to the extent that Australia has obligations:
(i) under international law; or
(ii) under the Compliance Agreement or any other
international agreement;

in relation to fishing activities by Australian-flagged boats on the high seas
that are additional to the obligations referred to in paragraph (c)--ensuring
that Australia implements those first-mentioned obligations;

D

Include in legislation modified text of specific treaty
obligations

The preferred method in Australia for implementing treaties in domestic
law is to give effect to selected treaty obligations by including them in
legislation but in a revised manner that is consistent with domestic legal
parlance and Australia’s interpretation of the international obligations.
This may be done by substituting vague expressions in treaties with more
specific terminology, the meaning of which has been developed over time
in the domestic legal setting, or by including an expanded or restricted
version of an ambiguous treaty obligation in accordance with Australia’s
interpretation of the treaty. This method has practical appeal because it
offers more certainty for government officers charged with the
responsibility to implement the treaty and provides an opportunity for a
State to elucidate the meaning of a vague treaty obligation in accordance
with its national priorities. The problem to be avoided is providing a legal
definition that is inconsistent with the interpretation of treaty obligations
by other State parties and which runs the risk of foreign States disputing
the legality of enforcement action taken in reliance on the domestic law.
Australian example 1: Piracy and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
Article 101 of the LOSC provides a definition of ‘piracy’. The text of this
article is given effect in three sections (ss 51-53) of the Crimes at Sea Act
1914 (Cth). Most of the language used is identical to the LOSC although
the legislation extends piracy to the territorial sea and some waters
landwards of the territorial sea. A lesser maximum penalty (15 years’
imprisonment) is provided for the offence of ‘voluntary participation’ in
the operation of a pirate ship compared with the act of violence, detention
or depredation offence (life imprisonment). The acts of ‘inciting’ or

191

192

The University of Tasmania Law Review

Vol 32 No 2 2013

‘intentionally facilitating’ other piratical acts can be prosecuted under
separate legislation (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)) which creates general
offences of incitement and aiding and abetting certain offences.
LOSC Article 101- Definition of piracy
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship
or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or
aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 51
‘[A]ct of piracy’ means an act of violence, detention or depredation
committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or
aircraft and directed:
(a) if the act is done on the high seas or in the coastal sea of
Australia--against another ship or aircraft or against persons or
property on board another ship or aircraft; or
(b) if the act is done in a place beyond the jurisdiction of any
country--against a ship, aircraft, persons or property.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
A person who urges the commission of an offence is guilty of the offence
of incitement: cl 11.4(1).
A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an
offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is
punishable accordingly: cl 11.2(1).
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Australian example 2: Interruption of hot pursuit and the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth)
Article 101 of the LOSC provides that a coastal State may conduct a hot
pursuit of a foreign ship in certain circumstances and that the pursuit may
only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone ‘if the
pursuit has not been interrupted’. The LOSC is silent regarding the
circumstances in which a pursuit will be regarded as having been
‘interrupted’. Under ss 87(1A)-(1C) of the Fisheries Management Act
1991 (Cth), a hot pursuit conducted by Australia with respect to suspected
fisheries violations must be done ‘without interruption’. However, the
legislation provides that merely losing sight of the pursued boat will not
amount to interruption nor will the loss of radar output or other sensing
device.
Fisheries Management Act 1914 (Cth) s 87
...
(2) For the purposes of subsections (1A), (1B) and (1C), a pursuit
of a person or boat is not taken to be interrupted only because the
officer or officers concerned lose sight of the person or boat.
(3) A reference in subsection (2) to losing sight of a person or
boat includes a reference to losing output from a radar or other
sensing device.

III

THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

The LOSC is one of the most ambitious international treaties because it
has set out the legal framework for all sea activities throughout the world
and it has achieved formal acceptance by the majority17 of the world’s
States, including numerous land-locked States. It is the principal
international law dealing with the world’s marine waters. Its main
contribution is that it provides for various zones of jurisdiction adjacent to
coastal States and sets outs the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction
of coastal States in them. The maritime zones the LOSC has confirmed or
created are critical to the activities of all States at sea because there is a
careful balancing of the rights of coastal States with those of other States
in the different zones. A coastal State has greater rights in maritime zones
in which it has full sovereignty (that is, internal waters,18 archipelagic
waters,19 and the territorial sea), 20 than in zones in which it merely has
17

With the notable exception of the United States of America.
LOSC art 8.
19
Ibid pt IV.
18
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‘sovereign rights’ (that is, the contiguous zone,21 the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ),22 and the continental shelf).23 There also are zones that are
beyond national jurisdiction (that is, the high seas24 and ‘the Area’25 – the
seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond coastal states’ continental shelf)26
and a special regime is established for straits used for international
navigation.27 Coastal States in particular face considerable challenges in
harmonising their domestic laws with LOSC. This is due to a range of
factors, including the spatial extent and scope of maritime jurisdictional
zones, the number of marine industries and activities affected, and the
ambiguities riddled throughout the LOSC text.
Although the LOSC is a binding legal agreement, it can be misleading to
view it simply as a legal document. It is a complex legal and political
instrument that is based on many hard-fought compromises between the
interests of various types of States (such as States with or without large
coastlines, States with large commercial, military or fishing fleets, and
developing States). There are overlapping rights and concurrent
jurisdiction between coastal States and flag States in the different
maritime zones and there are differences between coastal State and flag
State rights depending on the type of vessel or activity. Perhaps the best
example is that the EEZ is a zone in which the coastal State has almost
complete power with respect to fishing yet for navigational purposes it is
only marginally different from the high seas. There are also competing
principles for ocean use enshrined in the LOSC, such as between
preservation and protection of the marine environment and optimum
utilisation of marine resources, and between freedom of navigation and
protection of sovereignty and sovereign rights.
The various balances of interests that have been crafted into the LOSC
text provide ready scope for international dispute if States in their
activities and enforcement conduct do not respect the balances achieved.
Coastal States and flag States therefore face complex policy, regulation
and enforcement options. This is especially the case because the LOSC
text is deliberately vague or ambiguous in many places, yet State parties
need to ascribe further meaning into its provisions when they incorporate
20

Ibid pt II.
Ibid art 33. The contiguous zone is located in an area in which the coastal State has
‘sovereign rights’. However, the enforcement powers that a coastal State has in the
contiguous zone relate to the prevention or punishment of breach of laws within its
territory (that is, areas under sovereignty).
22
Ibid pt V.
23
Ibid pt VI.
24
Ibid pt VII.
25
Ibid pt XI.
26
Ibid art 76.
27
Ibid pt III.
21
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them into domestic law, in a manner that is workable for the government
officers who have the responsibility to implement the convention.
The LOSC covers many topic areas, ranging from defining the various
maritime jurisdictional zones to setting up marine environment protection
principles and rules and providing for the conduct of marine scientific
research, the development and transfer of marine technology, and
procedures for settling disputes between State parties. Its provisions
affect activities within all marine sectors (such as fishing, maritime
transport, defence and security, seabed resource exploitation, marine
scientific research, tourism, and environmental protection). A
complication is that other international agreements (both binding and
non-binding) have been developed since the conclusion of the LOSC
which have developed standards in various law of the sea topic areas.
This further development of international law of the sea was envisaged by
the drafters of the LOSC who created it as a framework convention
designed to facilitate the progressive development of the international law
of the sea.

IV INCORPORATION OF LOSC RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN
AUSTRALIA’S DOMESTIC LAW
The cross-sectoral nature of the LOSC, combined with Australia’s
sectoral approach to marine legislation, means that it is not practicable to
incorporate all of its provisions in one piece of legislation. This section
reviews the more difficult aspects of the legislative incorporation of the
LOSC in Australia, focusing on selected pieces of legislation from the
following list of implementing legislation. It is important to note that not
every article in the LOSC needs to be specifically incorporated into
legislation. For example, the complex detail about the limits of the
continental shelf provided in art 76 does not need to be repeated in
legislation.28 Rather, what is necessary is that there is competence of the
parliament to enact regulations or make proclamations that give effect to
the rights embodied in the article. As listed in the following table, this
power is provided in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973
(Cth).29
28
In some other areas there are no implementing regulations in Australia. For example, the
obligation to authorise foreign vessels to conduct marine scientific research in the EEZ
under LOSC art 255 is implemented by an executive granting of ‘public vessel status’ by
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a process that is unsupported by legislation.
29
Section 12 ‘Limits of the continental shelf’ provides: ‘The Governor-General may, from
time to time by Proclamation, declare, not inconsistently with Article 76 of the Convention
or any relevant international agreement to which Australia is a party, the limits of the
whole or any part of the continental shelf of Australia.’ Note that the Australian Parliament
has virtually unfettered ability to enact legislation with effect offshore under the Australian
Constitution’s external affairs power (s 51(xxix)) see Warwick Gullett, Fisheries Law in
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List of principal Australian implementing legislation for the LOSC

Sample
LOSC
provision
art 11

Legislation

Topic area

Maritime Transport and
Offshore Facilities
Security Act 2003 (Cth)

definition of port

art 28

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth)

art 60

Customs Act 1901 (Cth)

art 62

Fisheries Management
Act 1991 (Cth)
Environment Protection
and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999
(Cth)
Seas and Submerged
Lands Act 1973 (Cth)

in rem
proceedings
high seas
boarding and
safety zones
fisheries

s 35

whales

s 236

maritime zones
and limits

s 12

offshore
criminal
jurisdiction
flag State duties

s6

art 65

art 76
art 94

Crimes at Sea Act 2000
(Cth)

art 94

Shipping Registration Act
1981 (Cth)

art 98

Australian Maritime
Safety Authority Act 1990
(Cth)
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
Maritime Powers Act
2013 (Cth)
Protection of the Sea
(Powers of Intervention)
Act 1981 (Cth)

art 101
art 110
art 194

art 194

Protection of the Sea

Sample
legislative
section
s 12

s 22
s 84A(4A)

s 12

search and
rescue service

s 2A

piracy
right of visit

s 51
s 21

maritime
casualty

s8

marine pollution

s9

Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2010) 43-46. Note also that in accordance
with the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), a Bill must be
accompanied by a statement concerning its compatibility with human rights.
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(Prevention of Pollution
from Ships) Act 1983
(Cth)
art 219

Navigation Act 1912
(Cth)

A

detention of
unseaworthy
vessels

s 210

Maritime zones and limits

The maritime zone-based jurisdiction provided for in the LOSC means
that the most important task for coastal States when implementing the
convention is to ensure that they can establish the maximum allowable
limits to the various claimable maritime zones.30 The approach Australia
has taken to provide the legislative ability to establish these various zones
under domestic law is straightforward. The text of relevant parts of the
LOSC are included in the schedule to the Seas and Submerged Lands Act
1973 (Cth),31 namely LOSC Part II (territorial sea and contiguous zone),
Part V (EEZ) and Part VI (continental shelf). The various zones are
declared to have the same meaning as that provided for in the LOSC.32
The Act provides authority to the Governor-General to declare by
proclamation the limits of the various zones, provided that this is done
consistently with the LOSC.33 Proclamations have been made for all
zones. The latest is the Seas and Submerged Lands (Limits of Continental
Shelf) Proclamation 201234 which confirms the outer limits of the
Australian continental shelf including those areas of continental shelf
beyond 200 nm from the territorial sea baseline based upon the April
30

Note that coastal States must lodge with the United Nations charts or lists of coordinates
depicting the limits of the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf: LOSC arts 16(2), 75(2)
and 84(2). There is no requirement to depict the outer limit of the contiguous zone. This
limit may extend up to 24 nm from the territorial sea baseline (LOSC art 33(2)). Only
approximately half of the State parties to the LOSC have declared a contiguous zone.
States that have declared a contiguous zone include Australia, Cambodia, China, Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. States in the South and East Asia region
which have not claimed contiguous zones include Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea,
the Philippines and Singapore.
31
This Act was enacted principally to declare Commonwealth sovereignty in the territorial
sea and to exclude the operation of some state laws in this area. It was amended
significantly in 1994 by the Maritime Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth) in
anticipation of the entry into force of the LOSC.
32
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 3(1). The same approach is adopted in other
legislation. See, eg, Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) s 8 regarding the definition of
‘archipelagic waters’, ‘territorial sea’, ‘contiguous zone’, ‘continental shelf’, ‘exclusive
economic zone’, ‘installation’, ‘artificial island’, ‘structure’ and ‘safety zone’.
33
Sections 7(1) (territorial sea), 10B(a) (EEZ), 12 (continental shelf) and 13B(a)
(contiguous zone). The Governor-General may also proclaim historic bays and historic
waters: s 8.
34
Proclaimed on 24 May 2012.
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2008 recommendations of the United Nations Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (made in response to Australia’s November 2004
submission of scientific data and information on its extended continental
shelf).
Australia has generally taken a conservative approach to the setting of its
maritime limits. For example, it did not claim a 12 nm territorial sea until
1990 or an EEZ until 1994.35 The Australian Government took a
particularly conservative approach with respect to the Great Barrier Reef
by not enclosing it within straight baselines in order to avoid giving
control over its waters to the state of Queensland.36 However, concern has
been expressed about Australia’s 1987 proclamation of four historic bays
in South Australia37 and its claim of an EEZ and extended continental
shelf from Middleton Reef and Elizabeth Reef to the north of Lord Howe
Island.38
Although the legal power to define the limits of the various maritime
zones is in the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth), separate
legislation gives effect to the zones. For example, fisheries powers in the
EEZ are in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), the whaling
prohibition is in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), and the power to board vessels in the
contiguous zone is provided in the Customs Act 1901 (Cth).
Australian legislative authority to define the limits of the territorial sea

Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) s 7 – Limits of the territorial
sea

(1)
The Governor-General may, from time to time, by Proclamation,
declare, not inconsistently with Section 2 of Part II of the Convention, the
limits of the whole or of any part of the territorial sea.39
35

However, Australia had created a ‘declared fishing zone’ in waters 12 nm from the
baseline in 1967 and had declared an ‘Australian Fishing Zone’ to 200 nm in 1979: Gullett
W, Fisheries Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) 208-213.
36
Prescott JRV, The maritime political boundaries of the world (Methuen, 1985) 183.
37
The 1987 proclamation was replaced in 2006 by the Seas and Submerged Lands
(Historic Bays) Proclamation 2006 (Cth) which revised the limits of the bays and the
location of the baseline. There is doubt as to whether the bays qualify for historic status.
See Kaye S, ‘The South Australian Historic Bays: An Assessment’ (1995) 17 Adelaide
Law Review 269, 282 and Roach JA and Smith RW, United States responses to excessive
maritime claims (Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed, 1996) 36.
38
See Prescott V, ‘The uncertainties of Middleton and Elizabeth Reefs’ (1998) 100
Maritime Studies 8.
39
The proclamations made under this section regarding the limits of the territorial sea are
two proclamations establishing territorial sea baselines (1983 and 1987) and the declaration
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(2)
For the purposes of such a Proclamation, the Governor-General
may, in particular, determine either or both of the following:
(a) the breadth of the territorial sea;
(b) the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea,
or of any part of the territorial sea, is to be measured.
B

Fisheries

The various maritime zones confirmed or established by the LOSC
provide coastal States with different levels of rights and obligations with
respect to fisheries resources. In areas under sovereignty there are few
constraints imposed by the LOSC. There are none in internal waters; in
the territorial sea there is only the obligation not to hamper innocent
passage of foreign vessels (on which passage such vessels cannot engage
in fishing);40 and in archipelagic waters the traditional fishing rights of
immediately adjacent neighbouring States are preserved.41 However, in
the EEZ, which is the most contentious maritime zone (and for many
States their largest maritime zone), there is a careful balancing of rights of
coastal States and flag States. This is seen most obviously in the
obligation on coastal States to optimally utilise the living resources in the
EEZ.42 This means that coastal States must determine the total allowable
catch of the living resources in the EEZ and give access to other States,
under agreed conditions, to the surplus of the allowable catch.43 Although
coastal States have prescriptive powers to make laws and regulations with
respect to their sovereign rights in the EEZ, which include enforcement
procedures,44 the interests of foreign States are preserved by constraints
on enforcement activity. This includes restricting coastal State
enforcement activity on the high seas to circumstances of hot pursuit45
(including constructive presence),46 and the requirement that coastal
States must promptly release arrested vessels and their crews upon the

establishing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12 nm seaward of the baseline (1990).
Note that Australia’s territorial sea is restricted to 3 nm around some islands in the Torres
Strait in accordance with a treaty with Papua New Guinea: Treaty between Australia and
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning sovereignty and maritime
boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known as Torres
Strait, and related matters, 18 December 1978 (entry into force 15 February 1985, [1985]
ATS 4.
40
LOSC art 19(2)(j).
41
Ibid arts 47(6), 51(1).
42
Ibid art 62(1).
43
Ibid art 62(2).
44
Ibid arts 62(4)(k), 73(1).
45
Ibid art 111.
46
Ibid art 111(4).
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posting of ‘reasonable bond or other security’47 and the prohibition on
coastal States setting imprisonment as a penalty for violations of fisheries
laws and regulations in the EEZ.48 Each of these rights and obligations
requires implementing legislation that, for practical reasons, must provide
more content than what is provided in the LOSC. Other States might
consider Australia’s implementing legislation that has given content to
these provisions as being inconsistent with LOSC, in particular, the
manner in which some enforcement actions can be taken against foreign
fishing vessels.
1
Hot Pursuit
Foreign vessels suspected of fishing unlawfully in Australian waters may
be boarded and inspected on the high seas by fisheries officers where
there has been a ‘hot pursuit’. The customary international law right of
hot pursuit was codified in the LOSC. This treaty provides that where a
vessel flees to the high seas, pursuit may be undertaken when there is
‘good reason’ to believe that a vessel has violated the laws and
regulations of a coastal State.49 With respect to suspected fisheries
offences, the pursuit must be commenced while the foreign vessel is in
the internal waters, territorial sea or the EEZ of the coastal State.50 A hot
pursuit may only be commenced after a ‘visual or auditory signal to stop’
has been given ‘at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard’ by the
foreign vessel. The pursuing vessel or aircraft must first have satisfied
itself that the foreign vessel is within the limits of the EEZ. The pursuit of
a vessel to the high seas may only be continued ‘if the pursuit has not
been interrupted’, although there is no elucidation of the circumstances in
which a pursuit will be regarded as having been ‘interrupted’.51
The right of hot pursuit is included in Australia’s fisheries legislation.
However, although the domestic law provisions are generally consistent
with the requirements for hot pursuit set out in the LOSC, there are some
potentially significant differences. In particular, it was not until 2008 that
there was a requirement for a ‘stop order’ to be issued52 and a pursuit is
not to be taken as having been terminated or interrupted only because the
pursuing officer loses sight of the boat or loses ‘output from a radar or
other sensing device’.53 The discrepancies between the hot pursuit
requirements in Australian and international law, notably the previous
lack of a ‘stop order’ requirement in the former, potentially can be
47

Ibid art 73(2).
Ibid art 73(3).
49
Ibid art 111(1).
50
Ibid art 111(4).
51
Ibid art 111(1).
52
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 87(1A)(b).
53
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 87(2), (3).
48
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significant in operational contexts, as occurred during the 2002 seizure by
Australia of the Russian vessel, Volga.54 The circumstances leading up to
and including the arrest of the Volga were that Australia’s naval vessel
(which was outside visual range) had changed its course for the purpose
of intercepting the Volga and had sent off its helicopter while the Volga
was within Australia’s EEZ, although contact was not made with the
vessel until it had reached the high seas. Further, there was no order to
‘stop’ as such, but rather, there was a broadcast from the helicopter
announcing that the vessel was about to be boarded. In the course of
domestic legal proceedings, the absence of a stop order was of no
consequence because the primary responsibility of the court was to give
effect to the words in the legislation, not the LOSC. The significant
difference in expression between s 87 and art 111 means that the latter
cannot be used to confine the operation of the former.55 The consequence
in the domestic proceedings concerning the seizure of the Volga (which
was effected pursuant to the pre-2008 legislative provision) was that for
the purposes of domestic law, a pursuit may be commenced by an
authorised vessel or aircraft which changes course or increases its speed
in order to intercept the suspect vessel, even in circumstances where the
suspect vessel is outside visual (and possibly, radar) range, without the
need for a stop order to be issued.56
Legislative inconsistency with LOSC can also appear at the sub-national
level. Due to the complicated regime for offshore jurisdiction in Australia
(which involves overlapping federal and state responsibilities),57 hot
pursuits may also be conducted by state officers. For example, the ability
to conduct hot pursuit from New South Wales waters appears in s 261 of
the Fisheries Management Act 1994 (NSW) but the requirements for a
hot pursuit are expressed almost identically to the pre-2008 formulation
of hot pursuit in the federal legislation, resulting in a discrepancy between
NSW law and the LOSC which potentially could result in a breach of a
LOSC obligation, attributable to Australia.58
The potential for a State to be in breach of its obligations under the LOSC
due to activities it has undertaken lawfully under domestic law can exist
without any direct inconsistency between its domestic laws and the
LOSC. For example, a hot pursuit conducted by Australia must be in
54
See Warwick Gullett, ‘Prompt release procedures and the challenge for fisheries law
enforcement: The judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the
Volga Case (Russian Federation v Australia)’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 395.
55
Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325, 332.
56
See Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547.
57
See Warwick Gullett and Gregory Rose, ‘Australia’s marine jurisdictions under
international and domestic law’ in Warwick Gullett, Clive Schofield and Joanna Vince
(eds) Marine resources management (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2011) 25-40.
58
See also Fisheries Act 1995 (Vic) s 110 and Living Marine Resources Management Act
1995 (Tas) s 186.
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conformity with the provisions in the Fisheries Management Act 1991
(Cth). However, Australia has an agreement with France that hot pursuits
conducted by each other State with respect to third party States can be
continued through each other’s territorial sea.59 This relies on an untested
interpretation of LOSC art 111(3) that its apparent prohibition on hot
pursuits continuing through the territorial sea of third States does not
apply if the coastal State in question has waived the protection it receives
under this provision, as Australia and France have done with each other.60
A further area of possible inconsistency between LOSC obligations and
potential practice under the Australia-France Treaty is its attempt to
modernise the doctrine of constructive presence by extending its
application to a wide range of vessels used to support the operation of
foreign vessels illegally fishing in Australian or French waters.61
2
Automatic forfeiture
Many States provide as a potential penalty for foreign fishing in their
EEZ the forfeiture of things used in the offence, such as the fishing
vessel. This practice is seen as falling within a coastal State’s prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction in order for it to protect its sovereign rights
in its EEZ. The practice in other States is for vessel forfeiture to take
place after the conviction in a court of a fisheries offence, typically some
months after the vessel was apprehended.62 Australia has taken a novel
approach by effecting forfeiture of foreign vessels at the moment the
relevant offence occurs. This means that, for the purpose of Australian
law, the legal title in a foreign fishing vessel which fishes unlawfully in
Australian waters transfers to the Commonwealth of Australia at the
moment the acts constituting the offence take place.63 The concern here is
that, although the operation of this domestic legal provision has withstood
an exhaustive legal challenge in the domestic courts, the manner in which
Australia chooses to exercise its enforcement powers will still need to be
consistent with its obligations under the LOSC, especially regarding its
conduct of hot pursuits and boarding of vessels on the high seas as well as
59

Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic
on Cooperation in the Maritime Areas adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic
Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, Canberra, 24 November 2003
(in force 1 February 2005) art 4. Treaty text available at [2005] ATS 6, and (2004) 19
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law at 545–553.
60
Warwick Gullett and Clive Schofield, ‘Pushing the limits of the Law of the Sea
Convention: Australian and French cooperative surveillance and enforcement in the
Southern Ocean’ (2007) 22 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 545,
565-567.
61
See Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) ss 87(1C), (7).
62
See, eg, Fisheries Act 1996 (NZ) ss 252(3), 255(2). However, not all States provide for
forfeiture of fishing vessels upon conviction for fisheries offences. For example, in Taiwan
article 68 of the Fisheries Act 2008 (Taiwan) provides that catch and fishing gear may be
confiscated but there is no express power to confiscate fishing vessels.
63
Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) s 106A.
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the manner in which it fulfils it obligation to promptly release detained
vessels and their crews upon the posting of reasonable bond or other
security.64 Although there is concern about the apparent inconsistency
between Australia’s automatic forfeiture provision and various provisions
in the LOSC, the enactment of the section in question was not a matter of
legislative drafters simply being unaware of the nature of LOSC
obligations. Rather, s 106A was inserted into the Fisheries Management
Act 1991 (Cth) in 1999 in order to remedy a problem with respect to third
party interests that became apparent following Australia’s first seizure of
a suspected illegal foreign fishing vessel, the Panamanian-flagged Aliza
Glacial, in the sub-Antarctic ocean in 1997.65 This bold legislative action
reflects Australia’s strong stance regarding combating illegal foreign
fishing yet uncertainty remains about the full legal consequences of its
operation regarding ownership and flag State duties.66

C

Navigation

One significant aspect of the maritime zones available to coastal States
under the LOSC is the navigational rights of foreign flag States within
them, which needs to be considered if a coastal State seeks to take action
against foreign vessels in exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction. In the
EEZ foreign States have an almost unfettered freedom of navigation and
in the territorial sea they have a more restricted navigation regime known
as innocent passage. Subject to one exception, the innocent passage
64

LOSC art 73(2). See Warwick Gullett, ‘Smooth sailing for Australia’s automatic
forfeiture of foreign fishing vessels’ (2005) 22 Environmental and Planning Law
Journal 169.
65
Prior to 1999, a foreign fishing vessel could only be forfeited to Australia when a crew
member had been convicted of a fisheries offence involving the use of the vessel. In the
case of the Aliza Glacial two of its crew members were charged with fisheries offences but
they left Australia when they were released on bail. This meant there was little prospect of
a conviction being recorded, and accordingly, there was little chance that the Australia
would be able to realise its interest in the vessel. The Norwegian mortgagee of the vessel
initiated legal action under the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) in the Federal Court of Australia
to recover the vessel when its owner defaulted on loan repayments. The court ruled that the
mortgagee’s property rights in the vessel prevailed over that of Australia’s mere potential
proprietary interest, and therefore the mortgagee was entitled to recover the vessel:
Bergensbanken ASA v Ship Aliza Glacial [1998] FCA 1322. See also Readhead v
Admiralty Marshal (1998) 87 FCR 229. Australia introduced the automatic forfeiture
provision for vessels and equipment used in foreign fishing offences to ensure that the
forfeiture of vessels to Australia in similar circumstances will prevail over third party
interests. The section operates to transfer the title of a foreign vessel from its owner to
Australia at the time it is used in a relevant fisheries offence. Where a relevant fisheries
offence has been committed, the section operates to automatically forfeit to Australia the
vessel itself, fishing equipment and fish. The provision has also been held to apply to fuel
bunkers: Scandinavian Bunkering AS v The Bunkers on Board The Ship FV Taruman and
Others (2006) 151 FCR 126.
66
See, in particular, the decision of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
concerning Russia’s forfeiture of a Japanese fishing vessel following a conviction:
Tomimaru case (2007) (Japan v Russian Federation) ITLOS case no 15.
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regime does not apply within internal waters.67 Articles 18 and 19 of the
LOSC define ‘passage’ and ‘innocent’ and art 21 provides coastal States
with the prescriptive power to make laws to regulate innocent passage in
eight areas. Australia, consistently with many other States, has not
enacted laws which specifically regulate innocent passage. Rather,
enforcement action against foreign vessels regarding navigation will take
place mostly in accordance with general navigation provisions in the
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth).68
A special regime of transit passage applies in straits used for international
navigation.69 Transit passage ‘shall not be impeded’ by Strait States
although sea lanes and traffic separation schemes can be developed.70 In
Australia’s Great Barrier Reef and the Torres Strait (which is a strait used
for international navigation), Australia has developed a compulsory
pilotage regime applicable to foreign ships.71 This has seen objections
from other States.72 There is also a ‘particularly sensitive sea area’
(‘PSSA’) in the Torres Strait which is a new concept not found in the
LOSC but which has been developed by the International Maritime
Organization (‘IMO’).73 Some of Australia’s measures can be seen as
interpreting the LOSC in a manner that seeks to maximise environmental
protection, as a result of modern circumstances and challenges. However,
other States are likely to continue to interpret the LOSC in a narrow
manner and consider some of Australia’s measures as being inconsistent
with the LOSC.
67

LOSC art 8(2).
Note that ‘innocent passage’ rarely appears in Australian legislation. One exception is s 9
of the Navigation Act 2012 (Cth). This section provides that the application of certain
offences and civil liability provisions do not apply to foreign ships in the territorial sea ‘in
the course of innocent passage’: s 9(f). See also Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 22(4).
Similarly, there is no Australian legislative implementation of the ‘internal economy’
principle regarding coastal State discretion to exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships.
69
LOSC art 38.
70
Ibid arts 38(1), 4(1).
71
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) s 186H.
72
See Robert C Beckman, ‘PSSAs and transit passage: Australia’s pilotage system in the
Torres Strait challenges the IMO and UNCLOS’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development and
International Law 325.
73
See IMO Assembly Resolution A.982(24) Revised Guidelines for the Identification and
Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, adopted 1 December 2005. The IMO
designated the Torres Strait as a PSSA in 2003 following an application submitted by
Australia and Papua New Guinea: Julien Roberts, ‘Balancing Australia’s rights and
obligations to protect the marine environment: The Torres Strait Particularly Sensitive Sea
Area’ in Warwick Gullett, Clive Schofield and Joanna Vince (eds), Marine Resources
Management (LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2011) p 279. See also Roberts J,
‘Compulsory pilotage in international straits: The Torres Strait PSSA proposal’ (2006) 37
Ocean Development and International Law 93 and Chelsea Purvis, ‘Coastal State
jurisdiction under UNCLOS: The Shen Neng 1 grounding on the Great Barrier Reef’
(2011) 36 Yale Journal of International Law 207.
68
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V

CONCLUSION

There are a number of areas of textual disparity between Australia’s
domestic law and the LOSC, spanning a number of subject matters.
However, this does not mean that Australia is in breach of LOSC
obligations. This is because much of the LOSC is deliberately vague by
virtue of it being a global framework convention and it therefore needs to
be interpreted and clarified for the purpose of implementation by State
parties. For particularly vague provisions it is inevitable that State parties
will seek to ascribe them with a meaning that is consistent with their
practice and interpretation of the LOSC. Australia has unashamedly
sought to contribute to the development of the international law of the sea
by developing its implementation legislation and practice in a manner that
seeks to ‘modernise’ the interpretation of the LOSC so that it can be used
most effectively to address current maritime exigencies. There is a need
for such an approach because the LOSC text was settled over 30 years
ago in 1982 (and indeed the text of numerous provisions were settled in
the 1970s), long before the onset of modern challenges, such as large
scale illegal fishing, the resurgence and new vectors of maritime asylum
seekers, significant maritime security and piracy threats, and marine
pollution challenges. Further, there are considerable legal and political
challenges in effecting a formal textual amendment to the LOSC.74
Australia’s innovative interpretation of the LOSC is seen most obviously
with respect to domestic legal measures it has taken to improve its ability
to take strong action against foreign fishing vessels fishing illegally in
Australian waters, particularly with regard to the parameters of the right
of hot pursuit. Indeed, the Australian Government claimed that it was
‘working towards a 21st century definition of hot pursuit.’75 In 2004,
Australia’s Foreign Minister stated:
The furthering of legal concepts and principles through the development
of international custom, and the conclusion of bilateral, regional and other
international agreements, all provide impetus for the clarification and
expansion of legal concepts which may one day form part of the
76
Convention itself.

Few States have made formal objections to Australia’s implementation of
the LOSC. The notable examples are the objection to Australia’s
declaration of historic bays in South Australia by the United States77 and
74

See the procedures set out in LOSC arts 311–316, especially arts 312 and 313.
The Hon. Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Ten Years of benefits for Australia’ (Speech delivered
at the Symposium ‘Strategic Directions for Australia and the Law of the Sea’, Canberra, 16
November 2004) <www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2004/041116_unclos.html>..
76
Ibid.
77
Kaye, and Roach and Smith, above n 37.
75
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the concerns raised by a number of States (including Singapore, Panama
and the Russian Federation) about the legality of Australia’s compulsory
pilotage regime in the Torres Strait.78 However, Australia’s innovative
provisions in its fisheries legislation (in particular, regarding hot pursuit
and forfeiture of foreign vessels) have not been the subject of formal
objections.79 This may continue to be the case. A State which might have
different interpretations of the LOSC might not be inclined to lodge an
objection against Australia until such time, if ever, that Australia takes
enforcement action against one of its vessels. In the meantime, other
States might develop their implementing legislation in a manner
consistent with that of Australia, thus developing the body of State
practice that may be relevant in a future international dispute settlement
when ITLOS or another appropriate body will be obliged to clarify the
meaning of a disputed LOSC provision. Such piecemeal but progressive
development of State practice, in which State implementing legislation
plays a crucial role, is a pragmatic way of developing the international
law of the sea to the point where it needs to be in order to be most
effective in addressing modern challenges. Such an approach is arguably
more likely in common law States such as Australia which have a long
tradition of interpreting laws in ways that recognised their underlying
purpose. However, progressive interpretation of the LOSC can also be
seen by civil law States.80
Further developments in States’ interpretation of the LOSC can be
envisaged, especially by coastal States, such as Australia, which face
increasing pressures and threats to their zones of sovereignty and
sovereign rights. Areas for focus are likely to be the particularly opaque
rights enjoyed by coastal States in the contiguous zone with respect to
responding to security, immigration and quarantine threats, as well as in
the EEZ where there is much uncertainty about the full parameters of
overlapping coastal State and flag State rights. States should be
encouraged to implement the LOSC in a manner that is most conducive to
addressing modern challenges, provided that the essential balances
between coastal and flag States struck in the LOSC text are respected.
Such State practice may involve implementing legislation that adopts
ambitious interpretations of the LOSC text, yet the risk of this approach
78

Beckman, above n 72; Roberts n 73.
The Russian Federation did question the validity of Australia’s hot pursuit of the Volga
in the 2002 prompt release litigation in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) (above n 54). However, this argument was not entertained by ITLOS because in
the special prompt release proceedings the Tribunal can only address issues related to
prompt release: LOSC art 292(3).
80
For example, France has formalised its position that a hot pursuit can be conducted
through the territorial sea of a third State despite the wording of LOSC art 111(3): see
above n 59.
79
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resulting in international disputation can be ameliorated by the exercise of
discretion in taking strong enforcement action.
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